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OK Papa this is for you and everyone too!

They called Hayward Field the Carnegie Hall of Track and Field....but now they will be calling Carnegie Hall the Hayward Field of concert venues.

No Marching Bands. No Cheerleaders. No Tailgates....No need because the fans and the athletes make this hallowed ground magical without any need for help! I can't wait to see Bryce Foster do his first victory lap in this heaven sent venue. Thank you Phil. Thank you Bill. Thanks to all of the legends of Oregon track and field and especially thanks to all of the Hayward Field fans for making this among the greatest sports cultures in the country. It is no exaggeration to call Notre Dame the Oregon track of college football....31 National team titles. 5 Bowerman Trophy winners. 10 Olympic Gold Medals and the two founders of Nike!
Go Ducks!

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Players Who's NFL Stock Hurt Most From Cancellation

Interesting 2 NDSU guys mentioned. Bet they hate not playing UO and not getting the exposure that would have given them.

From Oregon, I'd say Scott and Faoliu at DT, J. Johnson and Redd at WR, maybe Breeze and Picket at S. as well. All borderline guys who could have proven their worth to the NFL.Hopefully some of them will get a shot anyway. Sewell...nothing left to prove, lol.


https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/draft...eason-could-hurt-these-nine-players-in-draft/

Guadalcanal: Naval Battles, part one

The battle for Guadalcanal was essentially the Japanese trying to get enough troops into the island to capture the air field. At the beginning of the battle they had only several thousand and the US had about 20,000. The Japanese route for transport of the troops was from where ever in the empire they could find them, get them to Rabaul and then to the Shortland Islands at the north end of the Solomon’s chain and then down to Guadalcanal. Japanese destroyers could make the round trip from the Shortlands over night, but transports were a two or three day trip. As long as the Americans held the air field and it was operational the transport method left the Japanese ships exposed to air attack during daylight hours.


So, the Japanese problem was they couldn’t re-inforce or resupply their forces on the island without taking the airfield and they couldn’t land more troops on the island without taking the airfield. They could only try to knock out the field by bombing or naval gun fire and the Sea Bees were so efficient at repairing the field that their bombing was minimally effective.


The American’s problem was essentially the same. The Marines on the island were subsisting on captured Japanese rations. After the airfield was completed the US had to first get defensive planes into the island and then sufficient fuel and ordinance to fight them.


For the first month the Japanese controlled the air and seas around the island. It was fortunate that the Japanese wasted this precious advantage.


The naval engagements all revolved around getting more troops and supplies to the island by both sides.


In the naval war the Japanese had a significant advantage in the superiority of their “Long Lance Torpedos”. They carried a larger TNT load than the Americans, had a longer range, had superior fusing and they were oxygen driven (rather than compressed air) and thus left little or no wake that the Americans could trace back to where they were fired from. Japanese destroyer torpedo tactics were also superior. Their destroyers fired immediatedly upon acquiring a target where as the Americans needed permission of the task group commander to fire which delayed the American offence. American torpedos had faulty depth setters, and had faulty fusing so that in several occasions the American subs could hear their torpedo hit the hull but it did not explode and had shorter range than the Japanese. These defects were later corrected , but even so the America Navy was curiously incurious about what seemed to be defective torpedos.


Another Japanese advantage was superior night vision optics and well trained spotters with superior night vision.


Savo Island:



This was the Japanese response to the US invasion in early August 1942. The Japanese sent a cruiser/destroyer force under Adm. Mikawa from Rabaul to hit the American invasion fleet. The Allied forces were under command of Adm Crutchly RAN and consisted eleven vessels including the radar equipped destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot, HMAS Canberra, USS cruisers Chicage, Astoria, Vincennes, and Quincy arranged around Salvo Island. The Blue and Talbot were cruising back and forth but their courses were not synchronized and sometimes there was a distance of over 25 miles between them. The US radar did not detect the Japanese, but the Japanese night vision look-outs saw the Allied ships and slipped into the allied fleet. The Japanese fired their torpedo’s and then opened fire. The allies were totally surprised and one Australian and three American cruisers were sunk and another(Chicago) heavily damaged. The Japanese had one cruiser and one destroyer damaged but sea worthy. Thankfully this was the worse American naval defeat in the entire Pacific War.


Mikawa then made a terrible strategic blunder.
Rather than follow up his success around Salvo Island and attack the vulnerable American landing forces just to the south he withdrew back to Rabaul., thus saving the American landings.


Battle of the Eastern Solomons.


Yammamoto next tried to re-inforce. He sent a powerful naval force covering three large transports which was also to eliminate Henderson Field. Air cover for this fleet was two fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo. The Americans countered with Saratoga and Enterprise and The Cactus Airforce.


The Japanese sent the Ryujo ahead to launch an attack on the airfield but more to act as a decoy to attract and American planes. This part succeeded and the Ryujo was sunk. The two carrier forces fought August 24th. The Enterprise was damaged and both sides lost a few planes. The Japanese carriers were unharmed but they withdrew, again failing to follow up on their advantage of two carriers against one. The American carrier Wasp had been re-fueling and did not take part in the battle. One advantage to the Americans was the transfer of the Enterprise air group to Henderson field. This gave the Americans daylight air superiority over Guadalcanal so the Japanese had to re-inforce and re-supply only at night. This advantage continued through out the Guadalcanal battle.


The next day the Japanese (without air cover) attempted to land the troops from their transports. Planes from Cactus sank one of the transports and several of the escorting ships and the rest withdrew.


The Japanese failure to persist in offensive naval action can be attributed to Nagumo being commander of their carriers. He had become gun shy after Midway. He also made the same mistake again and later in the war was reduced to commanding some patrol boats.


Battle of Cape Esperance.


This battle (October 11) revolved around attempts by both the US and Japan to reinforce Guadalcanal. For the US, the 164th Army infantry regiment left New Caledonia escorted by four cruisers and five destroyers (under Adm Norman Scott) projected to arrive at Guadalcanal on October 13. The Japanese force Mikawa’s 8th fleet was due to arrive about the same time and Adm Goto was to bombard Henderson Field. About midnight on October 11 Scott and Goto met near Salvo Island. Scott was in position to “cross the T” on the unsuspecting Goto. Scott sank one and disabled another of Goto’s cruisers and forced his retreat. However the other arm of Mikawa’s force did land about 775 troops. The 2900 US troops and their supplies of the 164th landed intact. The scheduled bombardment of Henderson field did not occur. But, as a follow-up on October 13 the Japanese sent another Tokyo express, this time protected by the battle ships Kongo and Haruna commanded by Adm Kurita. The battle ships were also to bombard Henderson Field. The bombardment lasted an hour and 23 minutes and the battle ships fired 973 14 inch shells from 18 miles off shore, beyond the range of Marine costal defense guns. Henderson field was knocked out and left the Marines and pilots punch drunk. The US lost 41 Marines including five pilots, most of their Avgas and all the torpedo bombers. The US was left with seven SBD’s and 29 F4F Wildcats at an auxillary field. The US had enough fuel for just one mission. The next night Mikawa again bombarded the field with 750 eight inch shells.


After this Nimitz assessment was the famous: “The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.” The US immediately began to resupply with planes from Espiritu Santo and Avgas flown in until fuel barges could reach the island.


The night of October 15-16 the Japanese again bombarded the field with over 1000 eight inch cruiser rounds but did less damage than the two prior bombardments and the US flyers from Cactus were able to do some damage to their ships.

Guadalcanal: Naval Battles, part two

Battle of Santa Cruz.


Yammamoto now decided to gamble his fleet to take Guadalcanal. He sent five battleships, four carriers and 58 other vessels. He was opposed by US taskforces under Kincaid and Willis Lee. The US strength was two battleships (Washington and South Dakota) and two carriers, Hornet and Enterprise. For the last time in the war the Japanese ship’s had full fuel tanks. One problem for the Japanese was that the skittish Nagumo was in command of the IJN carriers. Before dawn on October 26 both fleets launched their searches and at 5 am launched their CAP.


About this time the American got new orders from COMSOPAC: “Attack, Repeat Attack.” Only one man could have sent that, William F. Halsey. Just to know the aggressive Halsey was back in the war was an enormous boost to American morale.


The US commanders were hampered by poor communications. They should have had notice of the Japanese ships and their locations before 5 am but transmission snafu’s delayed the word to Kincaid. Also, the American air combat coordinator was new to his job and sent confusing information to his fighter and bomber squadrons and positioned them poorly. Japanese dive bombers and torpedo planes penetrated the US screen, destroyed the Hornet and damaged the Enterprise. Only superb maneuvering by the enterprise skipper (Hardison) and later aircraft heroics prevented her loss. The Japanese lost no ships but had extensive damage to two carriers and extensive flying personnel losses which they could not make up. They lost 148 pilots and crew men, the Americans lost 24 air crew men.


A big advantage the Americans had was that Enterprise, South Dakota and several other anti-aircraft support ships had been installed with the new Bofors 40 Millimeter gun in twin and quad mounts. They fired more than twice as fast as the old 1.1 mounts, were effective to 12,500 feet and had a rate of fire of 120 rounds per-minute. They accounted for over half of the Japanese aircraft losses and arguably made the American strategic victory possible. Actually the use of these weapons led to modifications in US carrier tactics for the rest of the war.


American and Japanese carriers would not duel again until the Marianas Turkey Shoot.


After Kincaid left the Hornet afloat, albeit with severe damage, to the advancing enemy there was a lot of hard feelings among the fliers which he never lived down. But, from that point no American carrier was again commanded by a non-aviator.



The Naval Battle for Guadalcanal.


The Japanese then decided to throw everything they had into neutralizing Henderson field. But, they had no carriers to protect the effort and had to depend on planes from Rabaul. Their fleet was again divided, and consisted of eleven large transports (making 11 knots), a cruiser bombardment group and a pair of battle ships, Hiei and Krishima which were also to neutralize the air field by bombardment. In early November Nimitz learned of this attempt and decided to re-inforce Guadalcanal with two Army battalions, food and ammunition. These supply ships were protected by two American naval taskforces and ultimately landed without mishap. The two naval forces were then to protect the landing areas and intercept what Japanese forces showed up.


The Americans were kept well informed by both coast watchers and patrol aircraft. However, the Enterprise and the two American battlships were two days sail away. The initial Japanese assault would have to be met by the cruisers and destroyers that had accompanied the American supply convoys.


The fight began about One Thirty am on November 14. It was an uneven fight, with the Americans losing most of their cruisers and destroyers (twelve out of thirteen) but they did inflict heavy damage to the Hiei and prevented the bombardment of the air field for that night. The Japanese also lost five destroyers. The Hiei was out of the fight and slowly limping north. The next day she was relentlessly attacked by planes from Henderson and Enterprise and finally sunk.


Adm Kondo was ordered to form another bombardment group for the next night out of what remained of the Japanese forces. In the mean time the Japanese sent a small cruiser destroyer force to bombard the field the night of November 14 but they did little damage.


Problems for the Japanese started early on November 14. They misidentified the Battleships Washington and South Dakota as cruisers so Adm Kondo did not know what he was facing when he sent in his bombardment group. Also, early on November 14 the Americans found the Japanese transport group, the real prize. They were opposed by planes from Enterprise and Henderson Field. The transports were about 30 minutes flying time from Henderson. Every plane that could carry a bomb or fire a gun was dispatched and at the end of the day only four of the transports were still able to make way and essentially no troops nor supplies reached the island for the cost of the Japanese fleet.


Kondo with Krishima, four cruisers and a destroyer approached the island just before midnight November 14. The US quickly lost the four destroyers accompanying South Dakota and Washington and the American similarly sank or disabled most of the Krishima’s escort. Just then the South Dakota suffered an electrical failure that left her helpless and she sustained considerable damage that took her out of the fight. However, Washington moving behind the American column got Krishima on her radar. In the next seven minutes

Krishima was hit by nine 16 inch rounds which totally disabled her and caused a severe list. She began to try to get away, but was too badly damaged and the Japanese commander ordered her scuttled.


The Japanese had lost two battleships in two days.


At 0025 on November 15 Kondo ordered a withdrawal and that moment is as good as any to fix the moment when the Americans won the battle of Guadalcanal.


The US Navy lost over 5000 men killed in the Naval battles around the Solomon’s during the battle of Guadalcanal. Almost 3 times the marine loses.


There is a Navy pilot that deserves special notice for the part he played at the battle of Santa Cruz. After the Hornet was sunk the full force of the Japanese torpedo attacks were directed at Enterprise. Her skipper Osborn Hardison evaded eleven torpedos. But, it is unlikely that he could have evaded eleven more that were taken care of by Navy Lieutenant Stanley Vejtasa flying a F4F in the Enterprise combat air patrol. Vejtasa shot down two dive bombers, six torpedo planes and caused three others to jettison their torpedos and flee. Vejtasa was awarded the Navy Cross. Several other fliers were awarded the Medal of Honor for feats of lesser magnitude.


The Japanese had underestimated the enormous latent power of the United States and its long sea faring tradition. They had to learn the hard lesson that the nation was well supplied with tough and ruthless captains eager to carry the fight to the enemy.

OT: Major Personal news

Good afternoon all,

I have some massive news to share of a personal nature.

About two months ago, I was contacted out of the blue by a recruiter for a position with a start-up company. The opportunity was fantastic and it was very intriguing; most intriguing, however, was the reality that they thought I would not consider the opportunity based on what they wanted to pay -- which was eye-opening.

Then about two weeks ago, I was contacted again, this time for a position similar to my current role, but it involves more responsibility and nearly 30% more pay. I had multiple interviews over the last ten days and was formally offered the position and accepted.

I have been with Roush for almost 10 years and have seen my work become a career and not just a job. For so many years I put aside the concept of career and this is a validation that the work I have done has tremendous value.

I am very excited to be taking this step -- even if nervous. I gave notice today and will begin working at the new role as Operations Site Manager on August 31. The job is with Kelly OCG and working with Intel. This is a really crazy time and I am so thankful for the support of Leslie Kegg Reed (*my wife) as I continue criss-crossing the nation and making changes that are pretty significant.

UCSF Claims to Have A prevention for Covid-19

I just saw this on my local news. Researchers at The University of California, at San Francisco ( UCSF) have an inexpensive way of bonding the virus so that can’t bond onto our lungs. They say that it will be an inexpensive over the counter drug. Apparently they are confident that it will work. Researchers believe that it could hit the market in two months. This is coming from one of the most reputable medical schools in the world. So it is news that should be taken seriously.
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