Guadalcanal: Naval Battles, part two
- By Papa Duck
- First Duck Club
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Battle of Santa Cruz.
Yammamoto now decided to gamble his fleet to take Guadalcanal. He sent five battleships, four carriers and 58 other vessels. He was opposed by US taskforces under Kincaid and Willis Lee. The US strength was two battleships (Washington and South Dakota) and two carriers, Hornet and Enterprise. For the last time in the war the Japanese ship’s had full fuel tanks. One problem for the Japanese was that the skittish Nagumo was in command of the IJN carriers. Before dawn on October 26 both fleets launched their searches and at 5 am launched their CAP.
About this time the American got new orders from COMSOPAC: “Attack, Repeat Attack.” Only one man could have sent that, William F. Halsey. Just to know the aggressive Halsey was back in the war was an enormous boost to American morale.
The US commanders were hampered by poor communications. They should have had notice of the Japanese ships and their locations before 5 am but transmission snafu’s delayed the word to Kincaid. Also, the American air combat coordinator was new to his job and sent confusing information to his fighter and bomber squadrons and positioned them poorly. Japanese dive bombers and torpedo planes penetrated the US screen, destroyed the Hornet and damaged the Enterprise. Only superb maneuvering by the enterprise skipper (Hardison) and later aircraft heroics prevented her loss. The Japanese lost no ships but had extensive damage to two carriers and extensive flying personnel losses which they could not make up. They lost 148 pilots and crew men, the Americans lost 24 air crew men.
A big advantage the Americans had was that Enterprise, South Dakota and several other anti-aircraft support ships had been installed with the new Bofors 40 Millimeter gun in twin and quad mounts. They fired more than twice as fast as the old 1.1 mounts, were effective to 12,500 feet and had a rate of fire of 120 rounds per-minute. They accounted for over half of the Japanese aircraft losses and arguably made the American strategic victory possible. Actually the use of these weapons led to modifications in US carrier tactics for the rest of the war.
American and Japanese carriers would not duel again until the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
After Kincaid left the Hornet afloat, albeit with severe damage, to the advancing enemy there was a lot of hard feelings among the fliers which he never lived down. But, from that point no American carrier was again commanded by a non-aviator.
The Naval Battle for Guadalcanal.
The Japanese then decided to throw everything they had into neutralizing Henderson field. But, they had no carriers to protect the effort and had to depend on planes from Rabaul. Their fleet was again divided, and consisted of eleven large transports (making 11 knots), a cruiser bombardment group and a pair of battle ships, Hiei and Krishima which were also to neutralize the air field by bombardment. In early November Nimitz learned of this attempt and decided to re-inforce Guadalcanal with two Army battalions, food and ammunition. These supply ships were protected by two American naval taskforces and ultimately landed without mishap. The two naval forces were then to protect the landing areas and intercept what Japanese forces showed up.
The Americans were kept well informed by both coast watchers and patrol aircraft. However, the Enterprise and the two American battlships were two days sail away. The initial Japanese assault would have to be met by the cruisers and destroyers that had accompanied the American supply convoys.
The fight began about One Thirty am on November 14. It was an uneven fight, with the Americans losing most of their cruisers and destroyers (twelve out of thirteen) but they did inflict heavy damage to the Hiei and prevented the bombardment of the air field for that night. The Japanese also lost five destroyers. The Hiei was out of the fight and slowly limping north. The next day she was relentlessly attacked by planes from Henderson and Enterprise and finally sunk.
Adm Kondo was ordered to form another bombardment group for the next night out of what remained of the Japanese forces. In the mean time the Japanese sent a small cruiser destroyer force to bombard the field the night of November 14 but they did little damage.
Problems for the Japanese started early on November 14. They misidentified the Battleships Washington and South Dakota as cruisers so Adm Kondo did not know what he was facing when he sent in his bombardment group. Also, early on November 14 the Americans found the Japanese transport group, the real prize. They were opposed by planes from Enterprise and Henderson Field. The transports were about 30 minutes flying time from Henderson. Every plane that could carry a bomb or fire a gun was dispatched and at the end of the day only four of the transports were still able to make way and essentially no troops nor supplies reached the island for the cost of the Japanese fleet.
Kondo with Krishima, four cruisers and a destroyer approached the island just before midnight November 14. The US quickly lost the four destroyers accompanying South Dakota and Washington and the American similarly sank or disabled most of the Krishima’s escort. Just then the South Dakota suffered an electrical failure that left her helpless and she sustained considerable damage that took her out of the fight. However, Washington moving behind the American column got Krishima on her radar. In the next seven minutes
Krishima was hit by nine 16 inch rounds which totally disabled her and caused a severe list. She began to try to get away, but was too badly damaged and the Japanese commander ordered her scuttled.
The Japanese had lost two battleships in two days.
At 0025 on November 15 Kondo ordered a withdrawal and that moment is as good as any to fix the moment when the Americans won the battle of Guadalcanal.
The US Navy lost over 5000 men killed in the Naval battles around the Solomon’s during the battle of Guadalcanal. Almost 3 times the marine loses.
There is a Navy pilot that deserves special notice for the part he played at the battle of Santa Cruz. After the Hornet was sunk the full force of the Japanese torpedo attacks were directed at Enterprise. Her skipper Osborn Hardison evaded eleven torpedos. But, it is unlikely that he could have evaded eleven more that were taken care of by Navy Lieutenant Stanley Vejtasa flying a F4F in the Enterprise combat air patrol. Vejtasa shot down two dive bombers, six torpedo planes and caused three others to jettison their torpedos and flee. Vejtasa was awarded the Navy Cross. Several other fliers were awarded the Medal of Honor for feats of lesser magnitude.
The Japanese had underestimated the enormous latent power of the United States and its long sea faring tradition. They had to learn the hard lesson that the nation was well supplied with tough and ruthless captains eager to carry the fight to the enemy.
Yammamoto now decided to gamble his fleet to take Guadalcanal. He sent five battleships, four carriers and 58 other vessels. He was opposed by US taskforces under Kincaid and Willis Lee. The US strength was two battleships (Washington and South Dakota) and two carriers, Hornet and Enterprise. For the last time in the war the Japanese ship’s had full fuel tanks. One problem for the Japanese was that the skittish Nagumo was in command of the IJN carriers. Before dawn on October 26 both fleets launched their searches and at 5 am launched their CAP.
About this time the American got new orders from COMSOPAC: “Attack, Repeat Attack.” Only one man could have sent that, William F. Halsey. Just to know the aggressive Halsey was back in the war was an enormous boost to American morale.
The US commanders were hampered by poor communications. They should have had notice of the Japanese ships and their locations before 5 am but transmission snafu’s delayed the word to Kincaid. Also, the American air combat coordinator was new to his job and sent confusing information to his fighter and bomber squadrons and positioned them poorly. Japanese dive bombers and torpedo planes penetrated the US screen, destroyed the Hornet and damaged the Enterprise. Only superb maneuvering by the enterprise skipper (Hardison) and later aircraft heroics prevented her loss. The Japanese lost no ships but had extensive damage to two carriers and extensive flying personnel losses which they could not make up. They lost 148 pilots and crew men, the Americans lost 24 air crew men.
A big advantage the Americans had was that Enterprise, South Dakota and several other anti-aircraft support ships had been installed with the new Bofors 40 Millimeter gun in twin and quad mounts. They fired more than twice as fast as the old 1.1 mounts, were effective to 12,500 feet and had a rate of fire of 120 rounds per-minute. They accounted for over half of the Japanese aircraft losses and arguably made the American strategic victory possible. Actually the use of these weapons led to modifications in US carrier tactics for the rest of the war.
American and Japanese carriers would not duel again until the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
After Kincaid left the Hornet afloat, albeit with severe damage, to the advancing enemy there was a lot of hard feelings among the fliers which he never lived down. But, from that point no American carrier was again commanded by a non-aviator.
The Naval Battle for Guadalcanal.
The Japanese then decided to throw everything they had into neutralizing Henderson field. But, they had no carriers to protect the effort and had to depend on planes from Rabaul. Their fleet was again divided, and consisted of eleven large transports (making 11 knots), a cruiser bombardment group and a pair of battle ships, Hiei and Krishima which were also to neutralize the air field by bombardment. In early November Nimitz learned of this attempt and decided to re-inforce Guadalcanal with two Army battalions, food and ammunition. These supply ships were protected by two American naval taskforces and ultimately landed without mishap. The two naval forces were then to protect the landing areas and intercept what Japanese forces showed up.
The Americans were kept well informed by both coast watchers and patrol aircraft. However, the Enterprise and the two American battlships were two days sail away. The initial Japanese assault would have to be met by the cruisers and destroyers that had accompanied the American supply convoys.
The fight began about One Thirty am on November 14. It was an uneven fight, with the Americans losing most of their cruisers and destroyers (twelve out of thirteen) but they did inflict heavy damage to the Hiei and prevented the bombardment of the air field for that night. The Japanese also lost five destroyers. The Hiei was out of the fight and slowly limping north. The next day she was relentlessly attacked by planes from Henderson and Enterprise and finally sunk.
Adm Kondo was ordered to form another bombardment group for the next night out of what remained of the Japanese forces. In the mean time the Japanese sent a small cruiser destroyer force to bombard the field the night of November 14 but they did little damage.
Problems for the Japanese started early on November 14. They misidentified the Battleships Washington and South Dakota as cruisers so Adm Kondo did not know what he was facing when he sent in his bombardment group. Also, early on November 14 the Americans found the Japanese transport group, the real prize. They were opposed by planes from Enterprise and Henderson Field. The transports were about 30 minutes flying time from Henderson. Every plane that could carry a bomb or fire a gun was dispatched and at the end of the day only four of the transports were still able to make way and essentially no troops nor supplies reached the island for the cost of the Japanese fleet.
Kondo with Krishima, four cruisers and a destroyer approached the island just before midnight November 14. The US quickly lost the four destroyers accompanying South Dakota and Washington and the American similarly sank or disabled most of the Krishima’s escort. Just then the South Dakota suffered an electrical failure that left her helpless and she sustained considerable damage that took her out of the fight. However, Washington moving behind the American column got Krishima on her radar. In the next seven minutes
Krishima was hit by nine 16 inch rounds which totally disabled her and caused a severe list. She began to try to get away, but was too badly damaged and the Japanese commander ordered her scuttled.
The Japanese had lost two battleships in two days.
At 0025 on November 15 Kondo ordered a withdrawal and that moment is as good as any to fix the moment when the Americans won the battle of Guadalcanal.
The US Navy lost over 5000 men killed in the Naval battles around the Solomon’s during the battle of Guadalcanal. Almost 3 times the marine loses.
There is a Navy pilot that deserves special notice for the part he played at the battle of Santa Cruz. After the Hornet was sunk the full force of the Japanese torpedo attacks were directed at Enterprise. Her skipper Osborn Hardison evaded eleven torpedos. But, it is unlikely that he could have evaded eleven more that were taken care of by Navy Lieutenant Stanley Vejtasa flying a F4F in the Enterprise combat air patrol. Vejtasa shot down two dive bombers, six torpedo planes and caused three others to jettison their torpedos and flee. Vejtasa was awarded the Navy Cross. Several other fliers were awarded the Medal of Honor for feats of lesser magnitude.
The Japanese had underestimated the enormous latent power of the United States and its long sea faring tradition. They had to learn the hard lesson that the nation was well supplied with tough and ruthless captains eager to carry the fight to the enemy.
