The battle for Guadalcanal was essentially the Japanese trying to get enough troops into the island to capture the air field. At the beginning of the battle they had only several thousand and the US had about 20,000. The Japanese route for transport of the troops was from where ever in the empire they could find them, get them to Rabaul and then to the Shortland Islands at the north end of the Solomon’s chain and then down to Guadalcanal. Japanese destroyers could make the round trip from the Shortlands over night, but transports were a two or three day trip. As long as the Americans held the air field and it was operational the transport method left the Japanese ships exposed to air attack during daylight hours.
So, the Japanese problem was they couldn’t re-inforce or resupply their forces on the island without taking the airfield and they couldn’t land more troops on the island without taking the airfield. They could only try to knock out the field by bombing or naval gun fire and the Sea Bees were so efficient at repairing the field that their bombing was minimally effective.
The American’s problem was essentially the same. The Marines on the island were subsisting on captured Japanese rations. After the airfield was completed the US had to first get defensive planes into the island and then sufficient fuel and ordinance to fight them.
For the first month the Japanese controlled the air and seas around the island. It was fortunate that the Japanese wasted this precious advantage.
The naval engagements all revolved around getting more troops and supplies to the island by both sides.
In the naval war the Japanese had a significant advantage in the superiority of their “Long Lance Torpedos”. They carried a larger TNT load than the Americans, had a longer range, had superior fusing and they were oxygen driven (rather than compressed air) and thus left little or no wake that the Americans could trace back to where they were fired from. Japanese destroyer torpedo tactics were also superior. Their destroyers fired immediatedly upon acquiring a target where as the Americans needed permission of the task group commander to fire which delayed the American offence. American torpedos had faulty depth setters, and had faulty fusing so that in several occasions the American subs could hear their torpedo hit the hull but it did not explode and had shorter range than the Japanese. These defects were later corrected , but even so the America Navy was curiously incurious about what seemed to be defective torpedos.
Another Japanese advantage was superior night vision optics and well trained spotters with superior night vision.
Savo Island:
This was the Japanese response to the US invasion in early August 1942. The Japanese sent a cruiser/destroyer force under Adm. Mikawa from Rabaul to hit the American invasion fleet. The Allied forces were under command of Adm Crutchly RAN and consisted eleven vessels including the radar equipped destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot, HMAS Canberra, USS cruisers Chicage, Astoria, Vincennes, and Quincy arranged around Salvo Island. The Blue and Talbot were cruising back and forth but their courses were not synchronized and sometimes there was a distance of over 25 miles between them. The US radar did not detect the Japanese, but the Japanese night vision look-outs saw the Allied ships and slipped into the allied fleet. The Japanese fired their torpedo’s and then opened fire. The allies were totally surprised and one Australian and three American cruisers were sunk and another(Chicago) heavily damaged. The Japanese had one cruiser and one destroyer damaged but sea worthy. Thankfully this was the worse American naval defeat in the entire Pacific War.
Mikawa then made a terrible strategic blunder.
Rather than follow up his success around Salvo Island and attack the vulnerable American landing forces just to the south he withdrew back to Rabaul., thus saving the American landings.
Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
Yammamoto next tried to re-inforce. He sent a powerful naval force covering three large transports which was also to eliminate Henderson Field. Air cover for this fleet was two fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo. The Americans countered with Saratoga and Enterprise and The Cactus Airforce.
The Japanese sent the Ryujo ahead to launch an attack on the airfield but more to act as a decoy to attract and American planes. This part succeeded and the Ryujo was sunk. The two carrier forces fought August 24th. The Enterprise was damaged and both sides lost a few planes. The Japanese carriers were unharmed but they withdrew, again failing to follow up on their advantage of two carriers against one. The American carrier Wasp had been re-fueling and did not take part in the battle. One advantage to the Americans was the transfer of the Enterprise air group to Henderson field. This gave the Americans daylight air superiority over Guadalcanal so the Japanese had to re-inforce and re-supply only at night. This advantage continued through out the Guadalcanal battle.
The next day the Japanese (without air cover) attempted to land the troops from their transports. Planes from Cactus sank one of the transports and several of the escorting ships and the rest withdrew.
The Japanese failure to persist in offensive naval action can be attributed to Nagumo being commander of their carriers. He had become gun shy after Midway. He also made the same mistake again and later in the war was reduced to commanding some patrol boats.
Battle of Cape Esperance.
This battle (October 11) revolved around attempts by both the US and Japan to reinforce Guadalcanal. For the US, the 164th Army infantry regiment left New Caledonia escorted by four cruisers and five destroyers (under Adm Norman Scott) projected to arrive at Guadalcanal on October 13. The Japanese force Mikawa’s 8th fleet was due to arrive about the same time and Adm Goto was to bombard Henderson Field. About midnight on October 11 Scott and Goto met near Salvo Island. Scott was in position to “cross the T” on the unsuspecting Goto. Scott sank one and disabled another of Goto’s cruisers and forced his retreat. However the other arm of Mikawa’s force did land about 775 troops. The 2900 US troops and their supplies of the 164th landed intact. The scheduled bombardment of Henderson field did not occur. But, as a follow-up on October 13 the Japanese sent another Tokyo express, this time protected by the battle ships Kongo and Haruna commanded by Adm Kurita. The battle ships were also to bombard Henderson Field. The bombardment lasted an hour and 23 minutes and the battle ships fired 973 14 inch shells from 18 miles off shore, beyond the range of Marine costal defense guns. Henderson field was knocked out and left the Marines and pilots punch drunk. The US lost 41 Marines including five pilots, most of their Avgas and all the torpedo bombers. The US was left with seven SBD’s and 29 F4F Wildcats at an auxillary field. The US had enough fuel for just one mission. The next night Mikawa again bombarded the field with 750 eight inch shells.
After this Nimitz assessment was the famous: “The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.” The US immediately began to resupply with planes from Espiritu Santo and Avgas flown in until fuel barges could reach the island.
The night of October 15-16 the Japanese again bombarded the field with over 1000 eight inch cruiser rounds but did less damage than the two prior bombardments and the US flyers from Cactus were able to do some damage to their ships.
So, the Japanese problem was they couldn’t re-inforce or resupply their forces on the island without taking the airfield and they couldn’t land more troops on the island without taking the airfield. They could only try to knock out the field by bombing or naval gun fire and the Sea Bees were so efficient at repairing the field that their bombing was minimally effective.
The American’s problem was essentially the same. The Marines on the island were subsisting on captured Japanese rations. After the airfield was completed the US had to first get defensive planes into the island and then sufficient fuel and ordinance to fight them.
For the first month the Japanese controlled the air and seas around the island. It was fortunate that the Japanese wasted this precious advantage.
The naval engagements all revolved around getting more troops and supplies to the island by both sides.
In the naval war the Japanese had a significant advantage in the superiority of their “Long Lance Torpedos”. They carried a larger TNT load than the Americans, had a longer range, had superior fusing and they were oxygen driven (rather than compressed air) and thus left little or no wake that the Americans could trace back to where they were fired from. Japanese destroyer torpedo tactics were also superior. Their destroyers fired immediatedly upon acquiring a target where as the Americans needed permission of the task group commander to fire which delayed the American offence. American torpedos had faulty depth setters, and had faulty fusing so that in several occasions the American subs could hear their torpedo hit the hull but it did not explode and had shorter range than the Japanese. These defects were later corrected , but even so the America Navy was curiously incurious about what seemed to be defective torpedos.
Another Japanese advantage was superior night vision optics and well trained spotters with superior night vision.
Savo Island:
This was the Japanese response to the US invasion in early August 1942. The Japanese sent a cruiser/destroyer force under Adm. Mikawa from Rabaul to hit the American invasion fleet. The Allied forces were under command of Adm Crutchly RAN and consisted eleven vessels including the radar equipped destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot, HMAS Canberra, USS cruisers Chicage, Astoria, Vincennes, and Quincy arranged around Salvo Island. The Blue and Talbot were cruising back and forth but their courses were not synchronized and sometimes there was a distance of over 25 miles between them. The US radar did not detect the Japanese, but the Japanese night vision look-outs saw the Allied ships and slipped into the allied fleet. The Japanese fired their torpedo’s and then opened fire. The allies were totally surprised and one Australian and three American cruisers were sunk and another(Chicago) heavily damaged. The Japanese had one cruiser and one destroyer damaged but sea worthy. Thankfully this was the worse American naval defeat in the entire Pacific War.
Mikawa then made a terrible strategic blunder.
Rather than follow up his success around Salvo Island and attack the vulnerable American landing forces just to the south he withdrew back to Rabaul., thus saving the American landings.
Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
Yammamoto next tried to re-inforce. He sent a powerful naval force covering three large transports which was also to eliminate Henderson Field. Air cover for this fleet was two fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo. The Americans countered with Saratoga and Enterprise and The Cactus Airforce.
The Japanese sent the Ryujo ahead to launch an attack on the airfield but more to act as a decoy to attract and American planes. This part succeeded and the Ryujo was sunk. The two carrier forces fought August 24th. The Enterprise was damaged and both sides lost a few planes. The Japanese carriers were unharmed but they withdrew, again failing to follow up on their advantage of two carriers against one. The American carrier Wasp had been re-fueling and did not take part in the battle. One advantage to the Americans was the transfer of the Enterprise air group to Henderson field. This gave the Americans daylight air superiority over Guadalcanal so the Japanese had to re-inforce and re-supply only at night. This advantage continued through out the Guadalcanal battle.
The next day the Japanese (without air cover) attempted to land the troops from their transports. Planes from Cactus sank one of the transports and several of the escorting ships and the rest withdrew.
The Japanese failure to persist in offensive naval action can be attributed to Nagumo being commander of their carriers. He had become gun shy after Midway. He also made the same mistake again and later in the war was reduced to commanding some patrol boats.
Battle of Cape Esperance.
This battle (October 11) revolved around attempts by both the US and Japan to reinforce Guadalcanal. For the US, the 164th Army infantry regiment left New Caledonia escorted by four cruisers and five destroyers (under Adm Norman Scott) projected to arrive at Guadalcanal on October 13. The Japanese force Mikawa’s 8th fleet was due to arrive about the same time and Adm Goto was to bombard Henderson Field. About midnight on October 11 Scott and Goto met near Salvo Island. Scott was in position to “cross the T” on the unsuspecting Goto. Scott sank one and disabled another of Goto’s cruisers and forced his retreat. However the other arm of Mikawa’s force did land about 775 troops. The 2900 US troops and their supplies of the 164th landed intact. The scheduled bombardment of Henderson field did not occur. But, as a follow-up on October 13 the Japanese sent another Tokyo express, this time protected by the battle ships Kongo and Haruna commanded by Adm Kurita. The battle ships were also to bombard Henderson Field. The bombardment lasted an hour and 23 minutes and the battle ships fired 973 14 inch shells from 18 miles off shore, beyond the range of Marine costal defense guns. Henderson field was knocked out and left the Marines and pilots punch drunk. The US lost 41 Marines including five pilots, most of their Avgas and all the torpedo bombers. The US was left with seven SBD’s and 29 F4F Wildcats at an auxillary field. The US had enough fuel for just one mission. The next night Mikawa again bombarded the field with 750 eight inch shells.
After this Nimitz assessment was the famous: “The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.” The US immediately began to resupply with planes from Espiritu Santo and Avgas flown in until fuel barges could reach the island.
The night of October 15-16 the Japanese again bombarded the field with over 1000 eight inch cruiser rounds but did less damage than the two prior bombardments and the US flyers from Cactus were able to do some damage to their ships.
